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The open spaces of global 
communication1
Do contemporary advances in global communication serve mainly to strengthen and extend international power relations already 
in place, or do they oﬀ er realistic opportunities to transform those tendencies into a more humane and harmonious world? Can the 
enormous barriers posed by fundamentalist thought eventually be overcome through intercultural contact?  How might the technological 
and cultural developments that are sweeping the world today bring about positive results by creating reﬂ exivity and public dialogue 
on a global scale? Any success that can be brought to fruition in the open spaces of global communication will depend on further 
expansion of a de facto global civil society that embraces profound technological and cultural change. Th is potentially transformative 
project develops in seven overlapping stages. I will now describe seven stages of the open spaces of global communication, starting with 
a summary analysis of the characteristic conditions of the Communication Age and ending with a hopeful vision of its full potential.
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Os espaços abertos da comunicação global. Os avanços na comunicação 
global servem para reforçar e estender as relações internacionais 
de poder já existentes ou podem oferecer oportunidades realistas 
para a transformação dessas tendências em direção a um mundo 
mais humano e mais harmonioso? As enormes barreiras impostas 
pelo pensamento fundamentalista podem ser ultrapassadas pela via 
do contato intercultural? Como os desenvolvimentos tecnológicos 
e culturais que se espalham sobre o mundo podem ter resultados 
positivos, gerando reﬂ exividade e diálogo público em escala global? 
Qualquer sucesso que possa vir a termo nos espaços abertos da 
comunicação global dependerá da expansão de uma sociedade civil 
de facto, que abrace a profunda mudança tecnológica e cultural. 
Este projeto potencialmente transformador se desenvolve em 
sete estágios sobrepostos. Serão descritos, nesse artigo, os sete 
estágios dos espaços abertos da comunicação global, começando 
por uma análise sucinta das condições que caracterizam a Era da 
Comunicação e terminando com uma visão esperançosa de seu 
pleno potencial.
Palavras-chave: comunicação global, interculturalidade, 
sociedade civil, era da comunicação.
Los avances en la comunicación global sirven para reforzar y 
ampliar las relaciones internacionales de poder ya existentes o 
pueden ofrecer oportunidades realistas para la transformación de 
esas tendencias hacia un mundo más humano y más harmonioso? 
Las enormes barreras impuestas por el pensamiento fundamentalista 
pueden ser superadas  por vía del contacto intercultural? ¿Cómo los 
desarrollos tecnológicos y culturales que se diseminan por el mundo 
pueden tener resultados positivos  generando  reﬂ exividad y diálogo 
público en escala global? Cualquier éxito que pueda venir a término 
en los espacios abiertos de la comunicación global dependerá de la 
expansión de una sociedad civil de facto, que abrace el profundo 
cambio tecnológico y cultural. Ese proyecto potencialmente 
transformador se desarrolla en siete instancias sobrepuestas. En ese 
artículo, se describirán  las siete instancias de los espacios abiertos de 
la comunicación global y se presentará un argumento que empieza 
por un análisis sucinto de las condiciones características de la Era 
de la Comunicación y se ﬁ nalizará con una visión esperanzada de 
su pleno potencial.
Palabras clave: comunicación global, interculturalidad, sociedad civil, 
era de la comunicación.
James Lull2
The open spaces of global communication
Vol. 11 Nº 2 - maio/agosto 2009 revista Fronteiras - estudos midiáticos 149
Do contemporary advances in global communi-
cation serve mainly to strengthen and extend international 
power relations already in place, or do they oﬀ er realistic 
opportunities to transform those tendencies into a more 
humane and harmonious world? Can the enormous 
barriers posed by fundamentalist thought eventually be 
overcome through intercultural contact? How might the 
technological and cultural developments that are sweeping 
the world today bring about positive results by creating 
reﬂ exivity and public dialogue on a global scale?  
Any success that can be brought to fruition in 
the open spaces of global communication will depend 
on further expansion of a de facto global civil society that 
embraces profound technological and cultural change. 
Th is potentially transformative project develops in seven 
overlapping stages. I will now describe seven stages of 
the open spaces of global communication and present 
an argument that progresses from one stage to the next 
– starting with a summary analysis of the characteristic 
conditions of the Communication Age and ending with 
a hopeful vision of its full potential.
Stage 1:  Cultural 
technology, industry, 
abundance
The astounding amount of information being 
produced and transmitted today, the rapid development 
of communications technology that facilitates worldwide 
transmission and connectivity, and the pervasive social 
interaction and cultural diﬀ usion that result from these 
developments all combine to deﬁ ne the Communication 
Age and create robust possibilities for the future. Th e 
number and diversity of cultural forms available and the 
ease of access with which more and more people engage 
information and connect with others put the positive 
potential of contemporary global communication in 
motion. Information is power, Joseph Nye reminds us, “and 
today a much larger part of the world has access to that 
power” (Nye, 2004, p. 105).  
Th e sheer amount of information now being 
produced has enormous consequences in and of itself. 
Worldwide information production increased by an 
astounding 30 percent each year between 1999 and 2002, 
with the greatest growth showing up in telephone and 
email communication (Lyman and Varian, 2003). Th e 
trend continues unabated. More than twenty-ﬁ ve years 
ago “the computer” was honored as Time magazine’s 
“Person of the Year.” At that time, 1982, “computer” 
and “connectivity” were not associated with each other 
in highly-integrated ways. Ten years later, the synergy 
between computational functionality, information 
production, and human communication on a global 
scale became clear. As Anthony Smith commented when 
the internet burst onto the world scene in the 1990s, 
information becomes the “transforming, paradigmatic 
idea” of our time. Like DNA, Smith said, information 
functions as “the organizing principle of life itself ” 
(Smith, 1996, p. 66).  
The metaphor of genetic determination is not 
overstated. The need to connect and communicate is 
hard wired into human experience (Manyard Smith and 
Szathmáry, 1999). People seek eﬀ ective ways to communicate 
with others in order to manage environmental uncertainty 
to best advantage. Th e neural ﬂ exibility of the human brain 
(Clark, 2003) resonates with the nature of communications 
technology to create the necessary resources to survive and 
develop by expediting what all people share – the need 
to interact with each other. Among the technological 
advances associated with information technology that have 
contributed much to the process are: 
• improved capacity, speed, and quality of 
communication technology (e.g. wireless access, 
broadband, ultra wideband, video and audio streaming, 
global real time);
• increased technical resolution and ﬁ delity (e.g. 
digitalization, high deﬁ nition video and audio, liquid 
crystal display monitors);
• increased technological reach, access, storage, 
and user-f riendliness (e.g. miniaturization, 
portability, aﬀ ordability, utilitarian design, modular 
convergence).
But we are mainly concerned with the larger issues 
that have opened up the spaces of global communication: 
• a rapidly increasing number and variety of mass 
media outlets worldwide;
• extraordinary growth and diversiﬁ cation of the 
culture industries;
• industrial and consumer blending of information 
technology and the internet with hardware and content 
of the traditional media and culture industries;
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• the rapid rise and adoption of personal 
communications technologies and the multiple 
levels of connectivity they facilitate;
• convergence between technological and non-
technological aspects of everyday life, and;
• an enormously expanded number and range of 
individuals and groups participating in cultural 
production and consumption. 
The growth of communications and cultural 
technology provides new opportunities for a broad range 
of interested parties. Many of the primary benefactors 
include the familiar players (Time Warner, Disney, 
Murdoch, Viacom, Bertelsmann, etc.) and a more recent 
assortment of powerful information technology and 
communications enterprises (e.g. Microsoft, Nokia, 
Comcast, Sony, Oracle). But proﬁ ts from the production 
of contemporary communication and culture are not all 
paid in money, and the gains don’t just accrue to the usual 
array of industrial forces. Technological development 
always has unintended consequences. Beginning with 
the printing press, the telegraph, and the telephone, the 
development of communications technology has always 
challenged the established brokers of social power.
We have progressed from the age of “old media” 
through “new media” to “we media” (Gillmor, 2004). By 
2003 nearly half the adult users in the United States had 
employed the internet to “publish their thoughts, respond 
to others, post pictures, share ﬁ les, and otherwise contribute 
to the explosion of content online” (Gillmor 2004, p. 162). 
Blogging, podcasting, and voice over internet protocol 
(VOIP) became popular forms of communication that 
avoid the usual corporate intermediaries. Empirical data 
from around the world presented by the United Nations 
makes it clear that “especially in developing countries, most 
ordinary citizens have many more sources of information 
(both in quantity and diversity) to turn to than they did 
10 years ago. And less of that information is subject to 
rigid state control” (UNDP, 2002, p. 6, 76). Popular access 
to basic information and cultural resources worldwide 
facilitated by today’s “technologies of diversity” brings 
about greater cultural self-determination for individuals 
everywhere (Cowen, 2002, p. 126-127). Th is is what the 
United Nations’ Development Programme calls cultural 
liberty (UNDP, 2004). 
Two important historical examples of cultural 
liberty stand out. People throughout Eastern and Central 
Europe were provoked by the growing, ultimately 
uncontrollable access they had to unofficial media 
channels and other informational resources which 
exposed the profound cultural and political limits of the 
communist system at the end of last century. With media 
and popular culture blanketing the world after World War 
Two, “more people became more aware of other people 
at a distance, of diﬀ erent ideologies and sets of beliefs” 
(Rantanen, 2005, p. 45). Speciﬁ cally, “Soviet audiences 
watching ﬁ lms [...] learned that people in the West did 
not have to stand in long lines to purchase food, did not 
live in communal apartments, and owned their own cars. 
All this invalidated the negative views promulgated by 
Soviet media” (Nye, 2004, p, 49). Th e revolts that resulted 
themselves became striking media content that was made 
globally visible, encouraging others to resist and eventually 
overthrow their state systems too. 
Th e People’s Republic of China went through much 
the same process when, beginning in the early 1980s, the 
national telecommunications system was greatly expanded, 
international satellite television arrived, and a series of 
critical ﬁ lms made by young Chinese ﬁ lmmakers were 
shown. Unoﬃ  cial popular culture (including much pirated 
music, video, and ﬁ lm) became available to city residents 
and international tourism became more widespread. All 
these developments changed the popular consciousness and 
there has been no turning back (Lull, 1991). Th e Chinese 
government still has to accommodate cultural change in 
order to maintain political power today. 
Stage 2:  Global visibility 
and transparency
When the United Nations oversaw the national 
elections being conducted in Afghanistan in 2004 it set 
up television monitors in outdoor locations throughout 
the country so people could see for themselves what was 
happening in the delicate and complex voting process. 
Th is approach – the “Witness Project” – was designed to 
defuse the rampant rumors and conspiracy theories that 
infect politics everywhere, but especially in the Middle 
East where democratic elections are so unfamiliar and 
little trusted.  
In the 1980s rock musician and social activist Peter 
Gabriel formed WITNESS, an organization that exploits 
the power of global visibility and transparency to expose 
human rights abuses around the world (WITNESS, 2005). 
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By using video technology and the distributive power of 
the internet, WITNESS and its NGO partner groups in 
many countries have brought global attention to various 
struggles for the rights of indigenous peoples, the use of 
child soldiers in Africa, gender violence in Mexico and 
elsewhere, and environmental destruction that directly 
aﬀ ects human communities everywhere, among many other 
issues. Th e organization’s website says the group “empowers 
human rights defenders to use video to shine light on those 
most aﬀ ected by human rights violations, and to transform 
personal stories of abuse into powerful tools of justice.” 
In order to impact the global consciousness, WITNESS 
depends on mainstream mass media to circulate their work. 
WITNESS’s partner video footage appears on mainstream 
media outlets like CNN, BBC, ABC, CBS, and PBS among 
many other television outlets, and is presented in major ﬁ lm 
festivals around the world.     
To routinely know much more than we have 
known before has become an expected, even natural, state 
of mind for people in many parts of the world. As former 
World Bank chief Joseph Stiglitz observed, “in successful 
democracies citizens regard transparency, openness, 
knowing what government is doing, as an essential part 
of government responsibility. Citizens regard these as 
rights, not favors, conferred by the government” (Stiglitz, 
2002, p. 51, his italics). Or as David Brin argues, “In a 
transparent society, citizens [...] will refuse not to know” 
(Brin, 1998, p. 270).   
Stage 3:  Platforms 
for participation
In a classic essay that analyzes the role of television 
in democratic societies, Newcomb and Hirsch (1987) 
describe the visual medium as a “cultural forum” that 
encourages public expression and discussion of all kinds 
of topics and ideas, even the most controversial and 
unpopular ones. Of course that’s not all that television and 
other electronic and digital media do. Commercial mass 
media have many other purposes and eﬀ ects, not all of 
them life enhancing by any means. But among its many 
roles and inﬂ uences, television uniquely and powerfully 
performs as a platform that generates widespread public 
awareness, reﬂ ection, discussion, and debate of countless 
social, cultural, and political issues.   
Th e ability of media and information technology 
to facilitate public discussion is also captured nicely by 
the idea of the “global commons” (Commission on Global 
Governance, 1995). In Great Britain, the commons 
referred originally to centrally-located tracts of land set 
aside in communities speciﬁ cally to foster shared public 
communication – the issuance of political and cultural 
announcements and the conduct of informal debates. Th e 
American equivalent of the commons is the town square 
or the town hall meeting. Today’s global commons “deﬁ ne 
and are deﬁ ned by the availability in media and cyberspace 
of spectrum or network space free of direct control by the 
forces of capital or the state” (Silverstone, 2001, p. 14). 
Th e cultural forum and the global commons emphasize 
the roles of mass media, information technology, personal 
communication technology, and popular culture in the 
production of public discourse that transcends national 
borders and creates diverse and democratic participation 
in the global public sphere. A clear and striking example 
of this phenomenon is www.chattheplanet.com, a global 
chat room that facilitates robust discussion of international 
issues on the internet.  
The decentralization of authority in global 
communication is perhaps best represented by the 
turn-of-the-century phenomenon of blogging. Blogs 
give rise to countless voices and opinions and serve as 
global outposts for fact checking. Any purported factual 
information disseminated by governments, religious 
groups, corporations, NGOs, media outlets, or other 
agencies or individuals immediately become subject 
to intense scrutiny and response from bloggers. When 
bloggers uncover errors or mistruths, their reports are 
picked up and further circulated by mainstream media 
insuring another level of discussion. In this way, blogs 
and diverse media function are considered together as 
system-correcting mechanisms on a global scale.  
The cultural forum and the global commons 
should not be thought of only in terms of news and 
politics, however.  Th e entire range of media content 
– entertainment television, talk radio, contemporary 
literature, comedy, and popular music, for example – 
raise themes and provide points of view that provoke 
widespread deliberations too.  Pop culture stars to play 
a crucial role in setting the critical agenda. To name but 
a few examples, think of Bono’s eﬀ orts promoting Th ird 
World debt relief, U2’s world tour advocating universal 
human rights, George Clooney’s work in the Middle East 
and his Arab-friendly ﬁ lm Syriana, and Angelina Jolie’s 
political activism in Sudan and Chad.    
James Lull
152 Vol. 11 Nº 2 - maio/agosto 2009 revista Fronteiras - estudos midiáticos
Considering how the cultural forum and the 
global commons tend to blend together, one metaphor 
has been used often to describe the hopeful quality of 
today’s global communication. It is the “conversation”. 
Kwame Appiah argues that transcultural “conversations” 
facilitated by technology are what we need “to live together 
as the global tribe we have become” (Appiah, 2006, p. xiii). 
Technology journalist Dan Gillmor points out that instead 
of the customary “top-down, manufactured” production 
of information by institutional news media, we have 
entered the age of an “edge-center, inﬁ nitely complex 
conversation” that has created an “inherent messiness 
that will open communications in ways that benefit 
everyone” (Gillmor, 2004, p. 46, 158, 67). And Th omas 
Friedman refers to “global conversations” about religion, 
terror, culture, and the future as part of the “ﬂ at world” 
phenomenon he believes deﬁ nes life in the twenty-ﬁ rst 
century (Friedman, 2003, 2005).   
Th e complementarity and convergence of media 
and communications technology expand the power of 
the conversation, further unleashing the multi-channel 
potential to communicate. Th e ﬂ exibility of asynchronous 
communications like email and blogs make it possible 
for great numbers of people to participate. Th e social 
circulation of information, images, sounds, and opinion 
by mobile phone, email, web pages, message boards, blogs, 
and chat rooms allows diverse individuals and small groups 
to organize their initiatives and mount their responses to 
global events on their own time schedule from anywhere 
(Lessig, 2004). Open sourcing challenges the hegemony 
of established protocols and interests in business, politics, 
religion, and culture.  
Th e populist potential of modern electronic and 
digital media is not limited to the liberal democratic 
nations of the First World. When China rushed to 
develop its telecommunications system in the early 1980s, 
unpredictable, often negative reactions to the government’s 
didactic information and dull entertainment programming 
were expressed by viewers. State authorities found that 
while they could effectively supervise production of 
most television programming, they could not control 
viewers’ responses. Less than a decade after playing 
the lead role in the plan for national modernization, 
television and popular culture provoked a civil unrest 
that led to the standoﬀ  at Tiananmen Square (Lull, 
1991). As information and communications technology 
have evolved and become more widely accessible since 
then, ordinary Chinese citizens now communicate and 
express themselves much more freely than ever before. 
Although personal comments on politics are not allowed 
in China, simple participation in online discussion boards, 
blogs, and podcasts has proven to be liberating: “the mere 
idea that you could publicly state your opinion about 
anything – the weather, local sports scene –felt like a bit 
of revolution” (Th ompson, 2006, p. 70-71). Today’s cultural 
“freedom ﬁ ghters” are “a half-billion mostly apolitical 
young Chinese, blogging and chatting about their dates, 
their favorite bands, video games – an entire generation 
that is growing up with public speech as a regular habit” 
(Th ompson, 2006, p. 156). If the cultural forum and the 
global commons represent platforms for entering the open 
spaces of global communication, then public speech is the 
process those platforms enable and inspire.  
An unprecedented “social inf rastructure of 
communication” has also opened up a “world of Muslim 
opinion, discourse, talk, and teaching” that facilitates 
interaction within and among Islamic groups, including 
links between Islamic diasporas throughout the world 
and their homelands (Eickelmand and Anderson, 2003, p. 
x-xi). Th e new satellite television networks in the Middle 
East have been crucial in creating space for discussion. A 
“new Arab public” is emerging today because of Al-Jazeera’s 
willingness to “put almost every issue – social, economic, 
cultural, political – under ﬁ erce public scrutiny” and the 
audience’s enthusiasm for thinking about and discussing 
these topics (Lynch, 2006, p.  241). Th e Middle East Media 
Research Institute (MEMRI) translates media content 
from the Arab region into the major languages of the world 
and posts it on the web, creating additional opportunities 
for dialogue across language and cultural groups.  
Stage 4:  Global 
consciousness and 
public opinion
Th e fourth stage of global communication refers 
to two interrelated phenomena: the increasing common 
awareness that develops when enormous numbers of people 
engage novel information and cultural forms, and the power 
of public opinion that emerges from that awareness.
People organize and evaluate their cultural vistas 
as located individuals and members of various groups. 
Th ey ponder their intercultural encounters in moments 
of conscious and subconscious reﬂ ection. Th ey discuss 
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new ideas with others. To borrow a term that grew from 
similar developments in the spread of media, culture, and 
politics in the stressful 1960s, today’s accelerated contact 
with information and cultural resources stimulates a global 
“consciousness raising.”  
Worldwide “interpretive aggregates” also develop 
from the massive exposure.  Th ese impromptu groups 
are composed of globally-dispersed individuals who 
don’t know each other personally but interpret known-
in-common themes similarly. They are not (warm) 
communities or even (cold) networks. Interpretive 
aggregates are ad hoc issue-by-issue coteries of widely-
scattered individuals whose opinions on controversial 
matters of common interest happen to coincide. Global 
consciousness raising and the forming of interpretive 
aggregates reﬂ ect two potent, interconnected consequences 
of media globalization – the global mass audience and 
global public opinion.  
Th e notion of the mass audience has a long history 
in traditional critical theory. Th e mass audience, according 
to the Marxist view, is a media-manipulated artifact of the 
“mass society”. Human beings are considered to be isolated, 
powerless, alienated persons who have no choice but to 
depend on the media for information, entertainment, and 
companionship. Th ey become dominated by the mass 
media and other impersonal institutions that surround 
them. Th is view does not make sense today, if it ever really 
did.  Large, anonymous audiences should not be equated 
with passive audiences (Webster and Phalen, 1997, p. 
116). To the contrary, the very size of the global audience 
empowers the persons who form it in ways they could not 
achieve as individuals acting alone or as members of small 
groups. Th e collective awareness and opinion of the global 
audience greatly inﬂ uences political decisions and cultural 
trends. Global public opinion – researched, interpreted, 
packaged, and circulated worldwide by commercial polling 
companies, international news agencies, the culture 
industries, and the internet – grows in direct relation to 
the access people have to information.  
Aggregated responses to world developments become 
part of the developments themselves and subsequently 
modify the discourses that are produced about them.  World 
opinion anticipating and responding to the United States 
invasion of Iraq, for instance, reinforced and spread resistance 
to the military assault and occupation.  Antiwar sentiment 
that emerged later in the United States was bolstered by 
the results of global opinion polls. Global pressure about 
human rights ended apartheid in South Africa. World public 
opinion forced the Mexican government to stop abusing 
its indigenous population in Chiapas. Th e government of 
Mynamar has had to defend itself against world opinion 
in the case of dissident Aung Son Suu Kyi. Tremendous 
external pressure is being brought to bear on Israel today to 
end its occupation of Palestinian territories and for China 
to withdraw from Tibet. Global opinion even quickly 
condemned American TV evangelist Pat Robertson’s call 
for the assassination of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez 
in 2005, forcing him to backtrack and apologize publicly. 
World public opinion uniquely shapes major decisions and 
then further interprets the outcomes of events in a back-and-
forth process of monitoring and display.3
Stage 5:  Global wisdom
In an interview with CNN’s Larry King in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
3 Although global public opinion often develops in unmanaged ways to challenge the inﬂ uence wielded by the world’s political-
economic power holders, purposeful attempts are also made by the powerful to shape global opinion for strategic reasons. Aid 
given by the United States to the victims of the tsunami disaster in Indonesia in 2004, for example, became an opportunity to show 
compassion and generosity.  Th e fact that so many aid recipients were Muslim was promoted by American foreign policy makers 
to demonstrate that the country harbors no religious prejudice against Islam. Promoting this kind of inﬂ uence is a completely 
reasonable thing to do. Joseph Nye argues that the United States and other Western nations should in fact do much more of this 
in order to cultivate favorable global public opinion by using soft power – “the ability to shape the preferences of others [...] the 
ability to attract [others to culture and political ideals]” rather depending on sheer economic and military might to achieve their 
goals (Nye, 2004, p. 5-6, x). It is not easy to assess the success or failure of attempts to manufacture agreeable public opinion. Many 
have argued, for example, that the Cold War was won by the attractive force of Western symbolic forms like music and movies and 
a vision of personal freedom. But people living in Europe’s communist states already had much in common ethnically and culturally 
with the outsiders who were trying to inﬂ uence them and were vulnerable because of the lack of religious ideology in the system. By 
comparison, American oﬃ  cials who design and implement the Middle East propaganda strategy say that the Cold war conducted 
against a “godless enemy” in the twentieth century was much easier to win than the one being waged now.
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Center and Pentagon in 2001, Queen Rania al-Abdullah 
of Jordan oﬀ ered an important perspective on the tragedy. 
She said that the shock of 9/11 has the potential to 
produce a global “moral consciousness”. Precisely because 
it took place in the age of global electronic and digital 
media, September 11th was ﬁ rst and foremost a symbolic 
event with tremendous emotional consequences. No other 
event in world history compares with its multimediated, 
intertextual reach and impact.  Has anyone anywhere not 
seen at least one visual representation of 9/11?
What Queen Rania was suggesting when she 
spoke of a worldwide moral consciousness has to do with 
what has occurred discursively since the Twin Towers 
fell and after the immediate circulation of television 
images, internet visuals, still photographs, reports, and 
commentaries. Her great hope – which has already begun 
to play out on the world stage – is that the terrorist strikes 
against modernity, secularism, America, and the West have 
stimulated a profound, transcendent, global process of 
soul-searching. Because people come to such introspection 
with widely-varying motivations and goals, the existential 
journey to shared moral consciousness will never ﬁ nally 
end. But the process itself inspires reflection across 
cultural boundaries. Th at imperfect undertaking itself can 
promote greater global wisdom. Cultural introspection 
has been made possible by modern communications 
media, technology, and industry, but it has been made 
necessary by contemporary political and cultural history. 
Th e shared base of commonly-held information that is 
growing so rapidly around the world today begs for ethical 
interpretation.  
No meaningful introspection or extensive elevating 
of moral consciousness can evolve without the global force 
of mass media, the culture industries, and the internet. 
Th e very program on which Queen Rania appeared, 
CNN’s Larry King Live, attracts middle-class viewers 
in more than 200 countries. Newsmakers everywhere 
eagerly accept invitations to appear on CNN and 
other high-proﬁ le television networks.  Th e mix can be 
impressive. One edition of Larry King Live, for instance, 
featured Pakistan President Pervez Musharaf, former 
Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, Prince Abdullah Ben 
Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia, Washington Post editor and 
journalist Bob Woodward, and various representatives 
from Al-Jazeera – all connected by satellite from around 
the world – discussing the consequences of 9/11.  
In their form, media discussions about the moral 
issues of the day do not resemble anything close to pure 
participatory democracy, rhetorical or political, not 
even among the invited participants. Guests appearing 
on Larry King Live, even when the program is carried 
by CNN International, must speak English. CNN 
International appeals mainly to global middle class 
residents, tourists, and business travelers. CNN, BBC 
International, and other international broadcasters 
transmit by satellite and cable whose subscription costs 
lie beyond the economic grasp of the vast majority of 
the world’s population. Al-Jazeera, Abudabi, Al-Arabiya, 
and other Arab television networks likewise use satellite 
technology to reach their middle-class viewers in the 
Middle East and around the world.  
Th e very fact that the necessary elements of a 
global forum have materialized at all is unprecedented and 
positive. And while the international English-speaking 
middle class may be the social group best able to take 
advantage of global media and information technology, 
it is also true that people who fall into this category wield 
disproportionate inﬂ uence over political and cultural 
developments through their direct involvement and the 
inﬂ uence of their opinions.  Moreover, while subscriptions 
to cable and satellite television and the internet may be 
the privilege of the global middle class primarily, many 
of the same images and discussions circulating about 
key news stories, issues, and controversies also appear on 
common terrestrial broadcast stations. Essentially the 
same discussions take place in many other languages and 
on other media and the internet.  Th e content of all mass 
media – particularly major news stories – also circulates 
rapidly through the unmediated networks of social 
groups representing all socio-economic levels and cultural 
orientations. It is the cumulative weight and signiﬁ cance 
of all these aspects of media and cultural globalization 
taken together that carry such great signiﬁ cance.   
At the heart of the process lies not only elevated 
awareness of the events and issues that deﬁ ne world history, 
but also awareness of that awareness and of its consequences 
for moral decision making. People everywhere know 
that they know more than they ever knew before. Th ey 
also know that others share the same basic information 
and that these others know that the information they 
possess is widely held.  Th ese interconnected realizations 
combine to influence what people do with shared 
information and how they feel about it. Th e very fact that 
people everywhere can ponder, reason, and emote over 
key world events together, unrestricted by the limits of 
time and space, has become a powerful inﬂ uence on the 
contemporary imaginary in general and on perceptions 
of individual events in particular.  
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Only the intercultural dialogues that are created 
through global communication have the capacity to evolve into 
a loosely convergent global wisdom – an intangible but forceful 
development that can shape moral thinking in an enlightened 
way and positively inﬂ uence the political decisions that result. 
If this scenario plays out successfully on the global stage, then 
David Brin, may be right when he says:
[...] civility just might make a comeback, after all.  But 
not as something exhorted, or enforced from on high. 
Rather, it may return as a byproduct as we all learn 
to live in this new ‘commons’, a near-future society 
where wrath seldom becomes habitual, because people 
who lash out soon learn that it simply does not pay 
(Brin, 1998, p. 169). 
Stage 6:  Institutional 
channels 
Authors of the United Nations’ Human Development 
Report (UNDP, 2002, p. 75) concluded that “a civic forum, 
giving voice to diﬀ erent parts of society and enabling debate 
from all viewpoints” is absolutely necessary for “deepening 
democracy in a fragmented world”. Th e United Nations 
document primarily addresses the plight of developing 
nations. Essential to making human progress in those 
countries, according to the international experts who 
wrote the report, are further development and diﬀ usion 
of communications technology, the expansion of media 
channels, and the growth of eﬀ ective civil societies.
Throughout this book I have emphasized the 
influence of market-driven channels of influence 
more than oﬃ  cial channels and government. But the 
United Nations, its ancillary organizations, and other 
international bodies continue to play decisive roles in 
these processes too. Th e UN charter formally mandates 
that the organization function as “an instrument at the 
service of humankind, a mechanism which links us all in 
our eﬀ orts to build a better world” in part by encouraging 
open and equitable communication within and among 
nation states (United Nations, 1999, p. 2).  
In order to do this, the UN has constituted an 
Information and  Communications Technologies (ICT) 
Task Force to “bridge the global divide, foster digital 
opportunity, and thus ﬁ rmly put ICT at the service 
of development for all” (United Nations Information 
and Communication Technology Task Force, 2005). 
Th e International Telecommunications Union, another 
UN organization, set out a Declaration of Principles 
and Plan of Action at the first World Summit on 
the Information Society held in Geneva in 2003 and 
followed it up with a meeting in Tunis two years later 
where the recommendations were put into practice 
(International Telecommunications Union,  2005). Th e 
idea of the internet as a “global resource” requiring fair and 
responsible growth and management was passionately and 
repeatedly stressed.  About the same time – late 2005 – 
the United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁ c, and Cultural 
Organization overwhelmingly passed a resolution 
stemming from its Universal Declaration of Cultural 
Diversity to “protect and promote the diversity of cultural 
expressions” and “to create the conditions for cultures to 
ﬂ ourish and to freely interact in a mutually beneﬁ cial 
manner” (United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁ c, and 
Cultural Organization, 2005). 
Th e United Nations General Assembly, Security 
Council, and associated organizations like UNESCO 
are not the only institutional channels through which 
essential transnational and transcultural negotiations 
take place. The World Economic Forum (WEF), 
incorporated as a nonproﬁ t foundation in Switzerland 
with UN endorsement (and much maligned by many anti-
globalization forces), functions as a “global knowledge 
hub” that advocates “entrepreneurship in the global public 
interest”. As a top priority responding to the current 
global crisis, religious, business, and political leaders of the 
WEF created the “Council of 100” in their 2004 meeting 
in Davos as an attempt to bridge the rift between the 
Islamic World and the West. Representatives from many 
developing countries have created the World Social Forum 
– where activists and agents from non-governmental 
organizations discuss alternative globalization policies and 
practices. And the independent Commission on Global 
Governance met in 1995 to stress the need for shared 
values, a global civic ethic, and enlightened leadership to 
help create a “global neighborhood”. 
Building on initiatives like these, David Held and 
his colleagues (Held et al., 1999) describe a visionary 
“global civil society”, a proposal Held further develops 
in subsequent writing (Held, 2004). By enacting 
international policies in economics, politics, and law that 
reliably reﬂ ect the ideals of a global social democracy, Held 
believes a “new global covenant” can emerge to promote 
greater social solidarity and justice worldwide (Held, 
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2004). Held maintains that “the conditions facilitating 
transnational cooperation between peoples, given the 
global infrastructures of communication and increasing 
awareness of many common interests, have never been so 
propitious” (Held et al., 1999, p. 5).  
As the material and symbolic conditions of life 
have changed over the years, so too has the notion of a civil 
society. Just thinking of civil society as a global phenomenon 
represents a conceptual migration away from its traditional 
and more parochial meaning toward what Held calls an 
“internationalism relevant to our global age” (Held, 2004, 
p. 178). But beyond the generally positive connotations 
the term inspires, exactly what constitutes a civil society 
and how it should function have never been widely agreed 
upon. Th e civil society can be considered part of the state 
apparatus or separate from it. It may be connected to the 
market or be excluded from it. In secular nations, civil 
society generally refers to the pro-active involvement 
of citizens in their communities through voluntary 
associations, foundations, and religious organizations; in 
theocratic societies the civil society is almost always equated 
with religious ideals and practices.   
By any deﬁ nition, civil society develops through 
willing contributions made by people to nurture 
the healthy growth of their communities. The civil 
society originates and matures in a cultural space that 
commutes between personal independence and social 
interdependence. As modern societies develop, individuals 
engage with others to pursue their private interests. For 
those societies to advance, however, the pursuit of private 
interests must be counterbalanced by active commitment 
to social responsibility and community. So while many 
individuals in the modern world acquire their identities 
by declaring their relative independence from others, 
they also manifest “a sense of shared interests in which 
individuals recognize both the duty they have to support 
themselves and their duties toward one another” (Edgar 
and Sedgwick, 1999, p. 63).  
Stage 7: Utopian potential    
On a warm summer day in 2005 many of the 
world’s most famous pop musicians staged the Live 8 
beneﬁ t concert calling for debt relief and the eradication of 
AIDS and poverty in Africa. According to the organizers, 
Live 8 was viewable by 85% of the world’s population. Th e 
concert originated in Europe and the United States and 
was transmitted in real time around the world via satellite 
television and the internet with an estimated audience 
of more than two billion viewers. Text message lotteries 
determined who got tickets to the live performances. 
Donations to the cause were accepted by mobile phone 
and the internet. DVDs, CDs, and audio and video 
downloads of the event are still being sold and Pink Floyd 
fans continue to buzz about the group’s brief reunion. 
Live 8 – a true twenty-ﬁ rst century communications 
event –was the most successful international pop music 
event in history. The global spectacle facilitated an 
extraordinary outpouring of ﬁ nancial contributions and 
clearly inﬂ uenced the political agenda at the G-8 world 
economic summit that was held in northern Scotland the 
following week.
The G-8 summit of 2005 was dramatically 
inﬂ uenced by another global event that originated that 
summer in Great Britain: the bombing of the London 
transport system by Islamist terrorists ﬁ ve days after the 
concert ended and just before the G-8 meeting began. 
Th e juxtaposition of these highly symbolic events vividly 
illustrates both the utopian potential made possible by the 
open spaces of global communication and their enigmatic 
vulnerabilities.     
Making genuine progress toward a more humane 
global coexistence requires that imbalances and injustices 
in international economic and political relations be 
rectiﬁ ed (Held, 2004). Just as vital to human development, 
though, is the need for improvement in global cultural 
relations, a less discernable project that cannot be 
reduced to military might, politics, or economics and 
is far less amenable to political negotiations and policy 
mandates. In the search for whatever common bonds of 
humanity we might call upon to unite us and achieve 
greater social justice, a broad commitment to promoting 
greater cultural understanding will be essential. Th e pen 
ultimately may not be stronger the sword when push 
comes to shove in geopolitical struggles, but the force of 
cultural transparency, expanded awareness, global public 
opinion, and the counter-hegemonic force of symbolic 
power in general have become inﬂ uences that no nation, 
religion, culture or high-proﬁ le leader today, no matter 
how dominant or conﬁ dent, can ignore.   
A cultural literacy ﬁ tting for the Communication 
Age requires that people sincerely question the limits of 
their traditions and political positions, respect cultural 
differences, accept diversity, and continue to develop 
multiple and complementary personal identities (UNDP, 
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2004, p. 88). Global citizens everywhere have much to learn 
about recognizing and relativizing their cultural biases 
and about harnessing the counterproductive, sometimes 
devastating, tendencies and consequences those biases can 
bring. Th e evolving presence of global discourses and the 
capability of enhanced communication tools make cultural 
introspection, discussion, and dialogue technically and 
emotionally feasible. Individual initiative and the desire for 
a more cosmopolitan consciousness will be key. As Terhi 
Rantanen argues, while “the ideal of united nations is not 
realistic, the ideal of individuals united beyond nation states 
is emerging” (Rantanen, 2005, p. 158).   
Religious fundamentalists, nationalists, and 
unabashed advocates of the “free market” all promote 
a particular kind of unity that serves their particular 
interests.  Th ose projects are no longer viable. Th e open 
spaces of global communication promise not unity, but 
opportunity for meaningful dialogue and nurturance of 
the global public sphere. Cultural negotiations that global 
media inspire will do much to determine the “moral future 
of civilization” by inﬂ uencing how the world is understood 
by its citizens (Silverstone, 2006). Th e challenge that lies 
ahead is formidable, but the opportunity for meaningful 
change is real. As Dan Gillmor observes: “we tend to be 
bound by our past, even when we can imagine the future. 
Yet sometimes we are transformed, and media can be 
at the center of how we see these changes” (Gillmor, 
2004, p. 236). He might have added, “and how we make 
the changes come about”.  No doubt, the lives of global 
citizens everywhere have been dramatically impacted by 
the sheer amount of information that ﬁ lls the open spaces 
of global communication, the diverse sources that create 
it, and the undetermined uses to which it is put.  
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